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In the imagined encounters one has with figures from the past,
how might James Kent appear? Some might find it slightly awkward
to visualize that bookish gentleman at a social function in the last
years of the twentieth century. If through some transmogrification
process Kent appeared among the early arrivals at a cocktail party,
his presence would probably not light up the gathering. Although
some sages possess a sparkling wit, in the learned and lucidly written
works of Kent, and in any moderate-sized sampling of his correspond-
ence, there is precious little evidence of that. Uncharitable members
of the current generation of law students, if they could conceive of
Kent as one of their contemporaries, might be inclined to apply the
adjective "nerdy."
Of course the above says more about us than about Kent, and
this essay is about both those entities. One cannot wrest someone
from a distant point in time and deposit that person in the present, at
least not in the world of nonfiction. Social roles shape the
development of humans as well as temperament. Even had Kent
wanted to be a basketball player, or a software designer, or a
legislative assistant to Newt Gingrich, those roles were not available
to him. He might well have been interested in the last two; surely not
the first. So in a sense it is pointless to speculate how Kent might
appear to us today. But in another sense it is well worth considering
why we choose to commemorate him at all. Is it just fortuitous, for
example, that there are Chancellor Kent Professorships at two major
law schools, and another named for him, when there is no comparable
recognition for Kent's mentor and early role model, Alexander
Hamilton? What is it about Kent that makes him a figure that
continues to interest and to impress us?
* University Professor, John B. Minor Professor of Law and History, and Class of 1963
Research Professor, University of Virginia. B.A., Amherst College, 1963; M.A., Ph.D.,
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In this vein, one needs to consider Holmes's assessment. "I ...
have to keep a civil tongue in my head when I am [Kent's] valet,"
Holmes wrote to John Norton Pomeroy in 1872, when Holmes was
immersed in preparing the twelfth edition of Kent's Commentaries on
American Law. Kent, Holmes continued, "has no general ideas,
except wrong ones."' By that statement Holmes, who was launched
on his project to produce a historically and philosophically grounded
overview of Anglo-American law, meant that Kent's Commentaries2
amounted to a collection of black-letter doctrinal syntheses overgird-
ed with what Holmes liked to call "benevolent yearnings" for an
idealized prepolitical jurisprudential and social universe.3 In short,
Kent, for Holmes, was a small-time jurist invested in an obsolescent
ideological agenda.
One also needs to consider the absence of a recent biography of
Kent. John Langbein recently described John Norton's 1939
biography as being "adulatory," unaware of several important
sources, and "insensitive to the main currents of American legal
history." Yet despite the cogency of Langbein's statement that "Kent
is about due for a serious biography," none has appeared. 4 Can it be
that close exposure to the Chancellor has a disaffecting, or even a
numbing, effect?
The above case against Kent as a figure of potential current
interest need not detain us very long. For starters, the late 1990s
1. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to John Norton Pomeroy (May 22, 1872),
microformed on THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., PAPERS (University Publications of Am.
1985); see also MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE PROVING
YEARS 1870-1882, at 16 (1963) (quoting letter); G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF 125 (1993) (same).
2. JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (Da Capo Press reprint 1971)
(1826-1830). For a discussion of Holmes's experiences editing the twelfth edition of Kent's
Commentaries, which were not wholly positive, see WITE, supra note 1, at 124-27.
3. Holmes described the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (use your property in
such a way as not to injure that of another) as a "benevolent yearning." Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr., Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1894). For confirmation of Kent's
investment in a set of ideas that allow him to be described as a representative of late eighteenth-
and early nineteenth-century Federalist thought, see JOHN THEODORE HORTON, JAMES KENT:
A STUDY IN CONSERVATISM 1763-1847 (1939); and John H. Langbein, Chancellor Kent and the
History of Legal Literature, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 547, 549-50, 554-69 (1993).
4. See Langbein, supra note 3, at 548 n.4. A person eminently qualified to produce an
authoritative biography of Kent, Professor Donald Roper, has apparently decided not to
undertake that project. See, e.g., Donald M. Roper, The Elite of the New York Bar as Seen from
the Bench: James Kent's Necrologies, 56 N.Y. HIST. SOC'Y Q. 199 (1972) [hereinafter Kent's
Necrologies]; Donald M. Roper, Justice Smith Thompson: Politics and the New York Supreme
Court in the Early Nineteenth Century, 51 N.Y. HIST. SOC'Y Q. 119 (1967); Donald M. Roper,
The New York Supreme Court and Economic Development, 1798-1823, in 3 WORKING PAPERS
FROM THE REGIONAL ECONOMIC HISTORY RESEARCH CENTER 58 (Glenn Porter & William
H. Mulligan, Jr., eds., 1980).
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ought to find his entrepreneurial spirit inspiring. Although Kent's
family background was socially and intellectually formidable, 5 the
Revolutionary War adversely affected his father's finances, resulting
in his being obligated to pursue a profession as a way of achieving
financial security.6 Although he benefited from the auspices of a
series of patrons, he was never able to achieve other than a modest
financial success as a young lawyer7 or subsequently as a law professor
at Columbia. Undaunted, Kent used the stipend from his Columbia
position to engage in land speculation, which shortly brought him
financial security,9 and ultimately, in large part because of the income
from his Commentaries, died one of the wealthiest New Yorkers of
his time.10
So the Chancellor as entrepreneur should resonate. In addition,
the historiographical paradigms of the early nineteenth century have
decisively shifted, seemingly to Kent's advantage. At the time
Horton's biography appeared the axes of early Republic
historiography pivoted around whether a figure was a "nationalist,"
or a member of the "propertied" (as distinguished from the property-
less) classes, or an "aristocrat" as opposed to a "democrat."'" On the
whole, one's reputation was more likely to endure if one were not
conspicuously "nationalistic," "propertied," or "aristocratic." Kent
5. Kent's paternal grandfather and father attended Yale, as he did, see Langbein, supra
note 3, at 550-51; his father, at one point, had sufficient means to live as a gentleman farmer and
occasional lawyer in upstate New York, see id. at 550.
6. Kent's early life was also complicated by the illness and eventual death of his mother
when he was a very young child. After being born near Poughkeepsie, New York in 1763, at the
age of five he was sent to live with his maternal grandfather in Norwalk, Connecticut. His
mother died when he was seven, and at nine he was sent to the Reverend Ebenezer Baldwin's
school in Danbury. After the outbreak of hostilities with England that culminated in the
Revolutionary War, Baldwin enlisted in the American cause as a war chaplain, and in 1776 died
as a result of contacting a disease in camp. The following year Kent, at the age of 14, enrolled in
Yale College, graduating with the class of 1781. During Kent's years at Yale, British troops
occupied New Haven and burned Kent's grandfather's Norwalk home in 1779. Yale College
students were forced to vacate New Haven as a result of the British presence, and Kent took the
opportunity to "retire ... to a country village," where he began reading the fourth volume of
SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (Oxford, Clarendon
Press 1766). See Langbein, supra note 3, at 549-52.
7. Kent began practice in Poughkeepsie, New York in 1785 at the age of twenty-one. See
Langbein, supra note 3, at 554.
8. After his second year of lectures, in 1795, he had only two students, and after his third
year none. See id. at 559-60.
9. See id. at 560 n.64 and accompanying text.
10. On the details of Kent's early career, see id. at 549-55; on Kent's wealth at his death,
see Edward Pessen, The Wealthiest New Yorkers of the Jacksonian Era: A New List, 54 N.Y.
HIST. Soc'y Q. 145, 168 (1970).
11. For an example of that sensibility, see Max Lerner, John Marshall and the Campaign of
History, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 396 (1939).
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appeared to be all three, and Horton's obvious sympathy for the
Chancellor in those capacities only served to isolate Horton. 12 Now,
thanks to Bernard Bailyn, Gordon Wood, J.G.A. Pocock, and a
number of other scholars, a cohort of late eighteenth- and early
nineteenth-century republican theorists has been placed in a less
"progressive" and more nuanced historical setting.13  Kent's
Federalism, or his elitism, or his wealth, or his forebodings about
majoritarian democracy are no longer the inevitable basis for a
caricatured portrait, or, worse, the implicit dismissal of a figure who
no longer interests."4
Then there is, finally, the Chancellor as cyberspace pioneer.
Well, not exactly a "trekkie" in cyberspace, but one exploring new
frontiers in the dissemination of ideas. As an analogical figure the
Chancellor begins to become luminous when one thinks about his
launching his previously unreported decisions, and his previously
unsystematized doctrinal simplifications, into a frontier void. Imagine
a world of lawyers and prospective lawyers, with a growing
population to serve and the exceptionalist litigiousness of American
culture swelling up, and yet with almost no law books. Imagine a
jurisdiction with no reported decisions to guide it, let alone any
written briefs. Imagine the only written source of law, apart from that
remote and mysterious document the Constitution, being a dog-eared
copy of Blackstone, someone who had written his Commentaries for a
nation whose political and social culture America was officially
rejecting and whose legal culture was becoming increasingly foreign.
Imagine, finally, almost no institutions devoted toward full-time legal
12. I presented a paper at a faculty workshop at the Department of History of the State
University of New York ("SUNY") at Buffalo in 1969. Horton and David Hollinger were both
members of the SUNY history faculty at the time. It was obvious to me, at any rate, whose star
was taken as rising and whose as setting. Compare the biographical treatments in HORTON,
supra note 3, and DAVID HOLLINGER, MORRIS COHEN AND THE SCIENTIFIC IDEAL (1968).
13. See generally BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1967); BERNARD BAILYN, ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1968); J.G.A.
POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT (1975); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 (1969); Gordon S. Wood, Democracy and The American
Revolution, in DEMOCRACY: THE UNFINISHED JOURNEY 508 BC TO AD 1993, at 97 (John
Dunn ed., 1992). For additional contributions, see the sources cited in G. EDWARD WHITE, THE
MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE 1815-1835, at 11-75 (abr. ed. 1991) [hereinafter,
THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE]. For an application of much of that
scholarship to Kent, see generally David W. Raack, "To Preserve the Best Fruits": The Legal
Thought of Chancellor James Kent, 33 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 320 (1989).
14. Consider Kent Newmyer's resuscitation of Kent's ideological ally, Joseph Story, in R.
KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE OLD
REPUBLIC (1985). Whatever adjective might have been applied to Story at the height of
"progressive" historiography's dominance, it would not have been "statesman."
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education: "law schools" whose students dipped in and out of lectures
like today's U.K. students preparing for their comprehensives, and for
whom virtually nothing-no meaningful degrees, no admission to a
bar, no systematic course of education-followed from their
enrollment.
Small wonder that when, in 1826, Kent decided to abandon law
teaching for the last time15 and to publish the lectures he had written
at Columbia between 1824 and that year as Commentaries on
American Law,16 he never had to rely on real estate speculation for
income again. Kent himself had prepared the way for the incredible
commercial and juristic success of his Commentaries. He began that
preparation by securing a series of judicial positions, all through the
intervention of his Poughkeepsie friend and neighbor John Jay, who
resigned as Chief Justice of the United States in 1796-the same year
no Columbia students signed up for Kent's law lectures-to run,
successfully, for the Governorship of New York. Jay appointed Kent,
successively, to the position of Master in Chancery, Recorder of New
York City (the equivalent of a municipal court judgeship), and
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of New York, the last in
1798.17 Despite that court's nomenclature, it was a trial court,
consisting of five judges who not only sat collegially for brief sessions
in Albany and New York City, but also rode circuit to hold individual
trials.18 Kent remained on the Supreme Court, becoming its Chief
Justice in 1804, until 1814, when he had reached the age of fifty.' 9
In 1814 Kent was appointed Chancellor of New York, a position
15. Kent had rejoined the Columbia faculty, occupying his former professorship, which
Columbia had left unfilled after his 1797 resignation, in 1823. He had been elected to that
position in November 1823 and began lecturing in February 1824. He continued his lectures
through the 1825-1826 academic year. By 1826 the first volume of his Commentaries had been
published, and the immediate commercial success of that volume apparently convinced Kent
that he, and law students, would be better served if he stopped lecturing and referred interested
students to his printed volumes. For the remainder of his life he retained a titular association
with Columbia but never lectured there or attended faculty meetings and did not receive any
salary. See JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., A HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL OF LAW, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
18-22 (1955); Francis M. Burdick, The School of Law, in A HISTORY OF COLUMBIA
UNIVERSITY 1754-1904, at 341 (1904); Langbein, supra note 3, at 564-65.
16. The first edition of Kent's Commentaries, which appeared in four volumes, was
published between 1826 and 1830. Between 1830 and Kent's death in 1847, at the age of 84, the
work went through five additional editions. Its last edition, the fourteenth, appeared in 1896. See
Langbein, supra note 3, at 565 (citing 293 AMERICAN LIBRARY ASS'N, THE NATIONAL UNION
CATALOG: PRE-1956 IMPRINTS 475-78 (1973)).
17. See Langbein, supra note 3, at 561.
18. For more details on the distinctive New York state court system of the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries, see id. at 562-63; and sources cited therein.
19. See id. at 564.
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he held until he was forced to retire from it in July 1823, when he
turned sixty. The position of Chancellor was an unusual one for an
early nineteenth-century American state court system. It reflected the
fact that New York, like England but unlike most American
jurisdictions, separated its common law and equity courts. The New
York Chancery Court was a trial court, based in Albany but meeting
twice a year in New York City.2 0 It was composed solely of Kent
during his years as Chancellor,2 and although its jurisdiction was
confined to equity cases, it provided Kent with a seat on the New
York Council of Revision, a unique governmental body created by
the New York Constitution of 1777 which, even though some of its
members were legislators, reviewed and vetoed legislative bills on
constitutional and other grounds.
22
All of this added up to more than twenty-five years of judicial
work, and Kent took full advantage of it. Once secure as a judge
(New York judges were appointed until the age of sixty), he began to
maximize the considerable intellectual talents that had resulted in his
standing first in his Yale college class, beginning to read law at the
age of sixteen,23 and being offered Columbia's initial professorship of
law (despite only having practiced law in New York for six months,
and that without much success) at thirty.24 By the time he accepted
the temporarily ill-fated Columbia professorship, Kent was already
not only an inveterate reader and creative synthesizer of legal
sources, he was a gifted synthetic writer, capable of exhibiting clarity,
precision, and what might be termed a stimulating reach in his legal
prose. His was a mind whose influence was bound to expand when its
thoughts were disseminated in the written discourse of his profession,
and he was well aware of his gifts.
II
Judging, researching, and writing were thus all of a piece for
Kent from the moment he had the opportunity to render opinions.
But he was adversely affected, at the time he joined the Supreme
Court of New York, by the absence of a tradition of written opinions
20. See id. at 563.
21. See id. at 562.
22. See HORTON, supra note 3, at 232-63 (discussing abolition of the Council of Revision
and Kent's ongoing involvement with New York politics); Langbein, supra note 3, at 563.
23. See Langbein, supra note 3, at 551-52.
24. See id. at 558.
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and by the nonexistence of any volumes of reported New York
decisions. Here again one has to make imaginative leaps from today's
information-glutted world. In 1798 most American judicial decisions,
state or federal, were orally delivered and unreported. There were no
official state reports in any jurisdiction until 1804. The few state and
federal cases that were reported appeared in privately published
volumes, such as Ephraim Kirby's Connecticut reports, Alexander
Dallas's miscellaneous collection of cases from the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania and the Supreme Court of the United States, and
William Coleman's selection of New York decisions.25 These private
reports-even Dallas's, which are now treated as the official U.S.
Reports-were merely impressionistic renderings of cases a given
reporter happened to think worth including, sometimes because
written opinions had been rendered in them, sometimes because the
reporter-invariably himself a lawyer or judge-happened to be in
court when an oral opinion was delivered or to have argued the case
himself.
26
Kent set out to remedy this situation. He first began to produce
written opinions in all the cases he decided on the Supreme Court of
New York.27 The idea of judges' routinely delivering written opinions
had not been part of British practice and was not well established in
America until the third decade of the nineteenth century.28 It was
nonetheless an idea with strong cultural roots, the United States
Constitution being a written document and republican political theory
being grounded on the sovereignty of the people and the idea of
25. See WILLIAM COLEMAN, CASES OF PRACTICE ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (New York, Isaac Collins 1801); A.J. DALLAS, REPORTS OF
CASES RULED AND ADJUGED IN THE COURTS OF PENNSYLVANIA (Frederick C. Brightly ed.,
New York, Banks & Bros. 1889) (1790) (including some cases from the Supreme Court of the
United States, which temporarily sat in Philadelphia); EPHRAIM KIRBY, REPORTS OF CASES
ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT (Acorn Club 1933)
(1789). For more detail on those early reports, see Craig Joyce, The Rise of the Supreme Court
Reporter: An Institutional Perspective on Marshall Court Ascendancy, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1291,
1297-98 (1985); and Langbein, supra note 3, at 573.
26. For more on the roles of early reporters, see THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL
CHANGE, supra note 13, at 384-426; and Joyce, supra note 25.
27. See Langbein, supra note 3, at 572.
28. For a discussion on the lateness of written opinions in the early nineteenth century, see
THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, supra note 13, at 386-87. This is not to say
that no tradition of reporting opinions, as distinguished from writing them, existed in England.
On the contrary, one of the reasons why American jurisdictions were relatively slow to develop
their own official reports was the availability, and prestige, of English law reports, especially
those containing decisions rendered before 1776. See JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., 1 HISTORY OF THE




written laws. Writing opinions also played to Kent's personal
strengths and enhanced the authority of his decisions.
29
But written opinions were not much use to anyone, except the
actual litigants in a case, unless they were also published. Kent was a
moving force in establishing an official state reporter for New York.
This process, which involved securing an appropriation for an annual
salary from the state legislature and finding a person competent
enough to summarize, annotate or emendate, and supervise the
publication of court decisions with their accompanying opinions, took
Kent some time, but by 1805, after a false start, Kent was able to
shepherd the appointment of his friend, fellow Yale graduate, and
ideological compatriot, William Johnson, as New York's official
reporter. Johnson was eventually to publish reports of every case
Kent decided as a member of the New York Supreme Court and as
Chancellor from 1806 to 1823 (when he was forced into retirement
along with Kent). He also even managed to publish accounts of
Kent's decisions in the years from 1798 to 1805, these in the form of
retrospective reports or digests.30
Early nineteenth-century Reporters did far more than simply
record decisions and opinions for publication, adding headnote
summaries. They acted as intermediaries between judges, litigants,
and the reading public. Very few of the persons who read official
volumes of reported cases had been in court when the cases were
decided, but early nineteenth-century judges typically did not scruple
to set forth the facts on which their opinions were based nor the
29. See Letter from James Kent to Thomas Washington (Oct. 6, 1828), in 1 SELECT ESSAYS
IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 837, 843 (Association of Am. Law Sch. ed., 1907).
30. See WILLIAM JOHNSON, A DIGEST OF THE CASES DECIDED AND REPORTED IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE AND COURT FOR THE CORRECTION OF ERRORS, IN THE
STATE OF NEW-YORK (Albany, E.F. Backus 1815); WILLIAM JOHNSON, REPORTS OF CASES
ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (Lorenzo
B. Shepard ed., New York, Banks, Gould & Co. 1849) (1808-1812); WILLIAM JOHNSON,
REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE,
AND IN THE COURT FOR THE TRIAL OF IMPEACHMENTS AND THE CORRECTION OF ERRORS, IN
THE STATE OF NEW-YORK (New York, Banks & Bros. 1864-1873) (1807-1824); WILLIAM
JOHNSON, REPORTS OF CASES ADJUDGED IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF NEW-YORK (New
York, Banks & Bros. 1873) (1816-1824).
Johnson was appointed the official reporter of New York State in 1805, replacing George
Caines, the first occupant of that position. Caines published his own reports of cases covering
the years 1803 and 1804. See GEORGE CAINES, NEW-YORK TERM REPORTS OF CASES
ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THAT STATE (New York, I. Riley
1813-1814) (1804-1806). Kent had a very low opinion of Caines, both as a reporter and as a
person, and was very close to Johnson. See Kent's Necrologies, supra note 4, at 202, 212-13
(quoting from letters and marginalia in Kent's papers). Kent dedicated his Commentaries to
Johnson. See 1 KENT, supra note 2, at iii.
[Vol. 74:229
THE CHANCELLOR'S GHOST
authorities buttressing their reasoning. Those jobs fell to the
Reporters, who regularly took bare-bones judicial drafts, or even
scattered remarks, and fashioned opinions themselves. The relation-
ship of judges to Reporters was thus a very important part of the
process of disseminating opinions, and Kent and Johnson were an
extraordinarily compatible pair. The result was that when Kent left
the Chancellorship in 1823 and began to write his Commentaries,
Johnson had helped him assemble a very detailed corpus of his own
decisions. In the years prior to Kent's retirement, Johnson's volumes
had helped elevate Kent's reputation, making it more likely that
prospective readers of the Commentaries might be impressed.
But for all of Johnson's dedicated (and largely anonymous)
efforts, Kent's best publicist was Kent himself. Here we come to the
central issues surrounding an assessment of Kent: What was it,
precisely, that made his decisions, and his Commentaries, so
successful? When a summary of American law is first published
between 1826 and 1830, and has sufficient influence and marketability
to be reprinted for the fourteenth time in 1898, the author has done
something right. Only Holmes's The Common Law,31 still in print 117
years after its original publication, and Blackstone's Commentaries,
which had the benefit of no comparable competitive work for over
fifty years, 32 outdistance Kent's treatise in longevity.
Kent scholars have approached the question of his influence
from several angles.33 Those most currently interesting appear to be
the harmony of Kent's methodology with the didactic assumptions of
republican thought,3 4 the striking efficacy of his conceptions of the
common law and legal science for nineteenth-century American
31. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881).
32. This is not to say that there were no treatises by American scholars on American law
subjects. For a discussion of early nineteenth-century treatises, with numerous examples, see
THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, supra note 13, at 81-104. It is rather to
claim that no American treatise comparable to Blackstone's in its comprehensiveness of
coverage and synthetic approach to a variety of common law subjects existed. Kent's
Commentaries filled that niche.
33. In addition to those singled out in this essay, earlier scholarship focused on the nature
of Kent's "conservatism" and his views on issues of political economy. See, e.g., Thomas P.
Campbell, Jr., Chancellor Kent, Chief Justice Marshall and the Steamboat Cases, 25 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 497 (1974); Joseph Dorfman, Chancellor Kent and the Developing American Economy,
61 COLUM. L. REV. 1290 (1961). Compare G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL
TRADITION 44-50 (1st ed. 1976) with the identical pages in the second edition (1988) where I
continued to suggest that the relationship between Kent's role as a judge and the protection of
property rights was the defining theme of his career. By then THE MARSHALL COURT AND
CULTURAL CHANGE, supra note 13, had appeared, but I guess I hadn't read it.
34. See Raack, supra note 13.
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culture,35 and his effective translation of a civilian, institutionalist
tradition of "learned" legal writing, well established in eighteenth-
century Europe, to an American setting. 6 I want to build upon each
of these themes, and to suggest that an additional one be considered:
the role of Kent, and other influential American treatise writers of
the nineteenth century, as what I will call savants: professed
interpreters of the essentialist, collected wisdom of the law and of its
cultural context.
III
In the third volume of the first edition of his Commentaries, Kent
wrote the following passage:
My mind has been too long disciplined by the actual business of
life, to indulge in general theory on law subjects, or to think it of
much value. The first duty of a law book is to state the law as it is,
truly and accurately, and then the reason or principle of it as far as
it is known; and if the author be a lecturer or commentator, he may
be more free in his observations on its history and character, and he
ought to illustrate it by comparison with the institutions of other
countries and ages, and, in strong cases, to point out its defects, to
show its false doctrines, and modestly and temperately to suggest
alterations and improvements. All this I have endeavored to do ...
but still the existing and leading rules ought to be laid open to the
inspection of the lawyer and the scholar, with mathematical
precision, and absolute certainty.
37
I used this same passage in The Marshall Court and Cultural
Change as an example of how Kent, part of a line of early American
treatise writers, had subtly altered the posture of the commentator by
surfacely subordinating a normative to a descriptive stance: "The first
duty of a law book is to state the law as it is."38 Here I want to unpack
it a little more extensively.
One feature of the passage needs attention at the outset. The
passage supplies an illustration of why Holmes would have concluded
that Kent "has no ideas except wrong ones." Holmes believed that
Kent's assumption that the law "as it is" could be stated "with
mathematical precision" was the fallacy that had driven mainstream
American jurisprudence of the 1870s into a dead end. Holmes singled
35. See Carl F. Stychin, The Commentaries of Chancellor James Kent and the Development
of an American Common Law, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 440 (1993).
36. See Langbein, supra note 3, at 585-93.
37. 3 KENT, supra note 2, at 88 n.b.
38. See THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, supra note 13, at 98-100.
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out the work of his contemporary Christopher Columbus Langdell
(who embodied "the powers of darkness" 9) as an illustration of
Kent's fallacy in operation. Langdell proceeded as if "the life of the
law" could be captured in a precise, mathematically inspired logic, a
methodology in which disembodied juristic truths-collectively, the
law as it was-were stated and applied. Holmes believed that the
Kent-Langdell project was philosophically and historically naive and
descriptively unsound.
40
But suppose, despite Holmes's critique, one were to grant Kent
his starting assumptions. The law-and the passage makes clear that
by "the law" Kent meant the legal rules laid down in American
jurisdictions41- could be stated authoritatively and in an unvarnished
fashion. The "reason or principle" supporting the law-once again,
the passage makes clear that Kent meant a discernible set of
collective justifications for common law rules-could be stated in a
similar fashion. In addition, a particularly discerning synthesizer of
"the law" was capable of propounding "the existing and leading
rules" so that lawyers could inspect them as they would inspect
mathematical formulas, treating them as precise and certain in their
accuracy and as comparable to mathematical propositions in their
predictive utility. Finally, a "lecturer or commentator"-that is, a
person who was engaged in academic as well as practical study of the
law-was entitled to interfuse the declarative portions of his synthesis
of "the law" with historical and comparative parallels and, "in strong
cases," 42 with critiques of "defects" and "false doctrines" in the corpus
39. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Frederick Pollock (Apr. 10, 1881), in 1
HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR
FREDERICK POLLOCK 1874-1932, at 16, 17 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1941).
40. Holmes had first used the phrase "[t]he life of the law has not been logic; it has been
experience" in a book review of CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF
CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACrS (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 2d ed. 1879). See Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., Book Notice, 14 AM. L. REv. 233, 234 (1880); see also WHITE, supra note
1, at 147-51.
41. Unlike later treatise writers, Kent did not produce treatises on separate legal fields. His
working definition of "law" encompassed constitutional as well as common law, although it did
not include, except by implication, a discussion of the small number of statutes that existed in
America in the first two decades of the nineteenth century. Kent was aware that both state and
federal statutes were subject to constitutional review and included United States Supreme Court
decisions reviewing them as part of "the law." See, e.g., 1 KENT, supra note 2, at 235-39
(discussing McCulloch v Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)). But he did not devote any
part of his Commentaries to a discussion of the relationship between statutes and common law
doctrines.
42. By "strong cases" Kent meant contested cases in which a judge or a group of judges
reasoned not only from authority but from "principle," a class of reasoning which could include
what later generations would call policy arguments. "Strong cases," for Kent, might be roughly
translated as "cases in which policy reasoning figured prominently" for moderns.
19981
CHICA GO-KENT LAW REVIEW
of American law.
Let us begin the process of recapturing Kent's intellectual world
by focusing on the last of his assumptions. Where did this freedom in
lecturers and commentators come from? Why were they permitted to
infuse their declarative statements of "the law" with what amounted
to academic excursions, some of them openly normative? Why didn't
Kent find an obvious contradiction between the "duty" of one writing
a law book to state the law "as it is" and the methodological and
interpretive license he took to be granted to commentators? Once
again, in the surfacing of an apparent anomaly, we find a clue to a lost
world of thought and belief.
43
Consider the following possible goals Kent might have projected
for himself once he made the decision to publish his lectures to
Columbia law students in the form of a book of commentaries on
American law. He might well have wanted to make money, and he
might have had in mind the very audience of lawyers, judges, and law
students in search of published versions of "American law" that he
had sought to reach through Johnson's reports. To reach that
audience, Kent needed not only to "state the law as it is," but to
perform that task in such a way as to convince its members to buy the
particular statement he offered to them.
Making money thus went hand in hand, for Kent, with producing
the sort of treatise which would function as a surrogate for the
myriad, but largely inaccessible, sources of legal authority in early
nineteenth-century America. His goal was to make his Commentaries
the sort of book that would be indispensable to practitioners, judges,
and students. We know how fully he achieved that goal. But how,
precisely, did he do it? In particular, how was he able to achieve such
a considerable commercial and juristic success with a book that
contained "no general ideas, except wrong ones"?
Obviously Kent was not writing for the Holmeses in his
audience. But were there any such persons? Holmes made his
comments twenty-five years after Kent's death: Holmes himself once
asserted that all ideas are dead after twenty years." Could it be that
43. "When reading the works of an important thinker, look first for the apparent
absurdities in the text and ask yourself how a sensible person could have written them."
THOMAS S. KUHN, THE ESSENTIAL TENSION: SELECTED STUDIES IN SCIENTIFIC TRADITION
AND CHANGE xii (1977).
44. There are several formulations of this thought in Holmes's correspondence. A more
formal version is: "[A]ny idea that has been in the world for twenty years and has not perished
has become a platitude although it was a revelation twenty years ago." THE MIND AND FAITH
OF JUSTICE HOLMES 399-400 (Max Lerner ed., 1943).
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Kent did have some general ideas that were perceived to be "right,"
or at least resonant, by his intended audience? Of course: books do
not have the impact of Kent's Commentaries unless they convey,
explicitly or implicitly, messages that resonate. What were those
messages? And what gave a "lecturer or commentator" -not a judge,
not a public, official of any kind-the presumptive authority that
might induce audiences to take his messages seriously?
A place to start with this last inquiry is the cultural status of
didactic roles in early American culture. Several professions -that of
the ministry, that of the Lyceum lecturer, that of the academician,
that of the statesman orator-enhanced their status through didactic
presentations to large groups of Americans. Most of those
presentations were oral, in part because of widespread illiteracy and
in part because of the difficulty of disseminating printed sources.
Their cultural purpose can be characterized as the dissemination of
knowledge and wisdom from elites to other citizens in a republican
social order. Republicanism presupposed that sovereignty, and
(theoretically) wisdom, lay in the collective people, but also that
popular wisdom needed to be filtered through and refracted by elites.
Didactic communication was a means by which wisdom was
disseminated. The people could theoretically reject and revise the
maxims and precepts in which they were being instructed, but in most
cases were expected to learn and to follow them.
45
Wisdom about law, however, could not wholly take an oral form.
This was because of the importance of a written constitution, and
other written sources of legal authority, in a republican polity.
Tyranny and arbitrariness in government were the endemic, besetting
sins on which the republican model of governance was founded.
Interested, passionate humans could not be trusted, once given
power, to refrain from being demagogues or royals or brokers of
corruption. They needed to be restrained not only by the structure of
American constitutional government but also by legal sources of
authority that any citizen could understand and invoke. It was not
enough to have those sources located in the realms of custom and
practice or in the collective memory of legal rules and obligations.
Clever, self-serving officials could recast oral sources to their own
advantage. The legal principles of republican government needed to
be written down so that the sovereign people could educate
45. See DANIEL WALKER HOWE, THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE AMERICAN WHIGS
(1979).
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themselves and so that officeholders could not abuse their power.46
But, on the whole, the legal principles of republican government
had not been written down. When Kent first began to lecture at
Columbia he knew, with the searing awareness of any professor who
finds no written help in preparing lectures, that "American law," in its
published versions, amounted to Blackstone and a handful of
reported decisions. By 1824 the written sources available to Kent had
begun to proliferate, thanks in large part to his own efforts. But they
were still meager. Nonetheless the importance of didactic
communication had not lessened; in contrast, the growth and
diffusion of population in America had increased its significance.
Here was a major cultural opportunity: the role of authoritative
didactic writer on American law. That was the very role Kent
assumed with the publication of his Commentaries.
Conceiving the role and executing it were, of course, two
different questions. Kent had considered the execution question well
before his Commentaries began to take shape. He would state the law
as it was, but he would do so as a commentator. He would embrace a
methodology in which "the law" was retrieved and made "scientific"
through purified analytical syntheses; one in which the commentator
both served as a funnel for disembodied collective wisdom and
improved upon that wisdom in his statements of it. He proceeded as if
nothing inconsistent or paradoxical was contained in the simultaneous
pursuit of those goals; as if a conception of commentary as glossing or
"improving" on the legal doctrines one collected did not undermine a
conception of law as an essentialist, predetermined entity, independ-
ent of the beliefs and values of those who promulgated it.
One cannot faithfully replicate Kent's jurisprudence, or under-
stand his historical significance, if one proceeds on the assumption
that his methodology was premised on an elementary jurisprudential
error. We have a hard time recovering the state of mind in which a
commentator could believe that he was documenting essentialist
wisdom, as manifested in a series of common law rules, and at the
same time occasionally tinkering with that wisdom-restating it in
improved form or criticizing it-in order to present it to his audience
in a more perfected form. Our difficulties say as much about us as
about Kent. He assumed that as a certain breed of trained
46. See RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE
YOUNG REPUBLIC 23-42 (1971); WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, supra
note 13, at 111-22.
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professional-a savant-he had special access to technical and
recondite legal sources, and the same training that enabled him to
distill those sources provided a justification for his occasionally
"improving" upon their meaning.47 But before pursuing Kent's status
as a savant in more detail, we need to look a little further into his
major task as a commentator, that of distilling "the law." Where did
his distillations come from, and how did he think such a task was
possible?
Intellectual life in the elite circles of Western culture48 in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries might appear, from the
vantage points of our more professionalized, specialized, and
information-saturated world, an arrogant, provincial, and status-
ridden enterprise. And, comparatively speaking, it was. Kent was able
to become a legal commentator, in important part, because-
notwithstanding his anxiety about financial security-he had the
money, the social status, and the attendant leisure to have access to a
large number of books about law. Not only did few Americans of
Kent's time possess the resources necessary to consult numerous legal
sources, only a handful of those could have made any sense of them.
Kent was conspicuous among his peers in being interested in written
sources of law and even more conspicuous in being able to digest
them and to render them intelligibly in written form.
Discovery of this sort was a valued cultural enterprise for the
high-status males whom Kent regarded as his peers. A sense that the
world was opening up, and knowledge with it, helped drive the
diverse intellectual explorations of Franklin, Jefferson, Crevecouer,
deTocqueville, Gibbon, and Rush. Developments in transportation
were helping facilitate the gathering of information, but intellectual
discovery was also abetted by the belief that knowledge could be
ordered in scientifically and philosophically harmonious and
instructive terms. An intellectual explorer was not only able to
expand the basis of his knowledge, but was able to organize and
classify his data in fruitful and instructive ways, consistent with the
truths about the natural world that investigation was helping to
confirm.
47. For a discussion of the stance of commentators, see THE MARSHALL COURT AND
CULTURAL CHANGE, supra note 13, at 98-100.
48. I am not suggesting that these cultural patterns were unique to late eighteenth- and
early nineteenth-century Western culture, by which I mean the United States and Western
Europe. My examples are drawn from nations whose legal sources Kent would have consulted.
He could read Latin, French, and ancient Greek, but not Spanish, Eastern European, African,
or Oriental languages. See HORTON, supra note 3, at 10, 23.
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Late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century American
"science" should not be thought of as the equivalent of its Darwinist-
inspired late nineteenth-century counterpart. "Natural philosophers"
included what we would now call botanists, zoologists, geologists, and
paleontologists. A scientist was a philosopher, and vice versa, because
both explorers began their inquiries with the purpose of discovering,
organizing, classifying, and ultimately explaining data. The explanato-
ry systems, some of them derived from religious belief, were taken to
be in place: discovery meant finding and making sense of the vastly
increased body of data now available to humans. The enhanced
availability of that data was not just a function of improved resources
for gaining access to them, but also a function of perfected intellectual
techniques for making sense of them.49
Kent took himself to be a legal scientist, and the common law to
be a repository of scientific legal wisdom, in the above sense. He
believed that the doctrines collectively promulgated in cases in the
recurrent legal subject areas of his time amounted to a species of
nascent scientific truth. At the same time, he knew, having attempted
to collect and to organize case law decisions, that the returns from his
searches were scattered. Having come to this realization very early in
his career-at least by the time he attempted to put together his first
series of law lectures at Columbia-he understood, as few of his
American contemporaries did, the importance of written, published
reports of judicial opinions. By the time he returned to Columbia to
begin the project that led to his Commentaries, he had significantly
increased his database, and, having been a judge with a consuming
interest in producing his own written opinions, he knew how to find
sources of legal authority.
None of Kent's experience would have been much help in
establishing him as an authoritative jurisprudential force in American
law, however, had it not been for the governing presupposition of his
contemporaries that the rules laid down, in those sources of common
and constitutional law which a lawyer could consult or a commentator
could gloss, were "the law." Missing cases, or unreported decisions,
did not pose significant jurisprudential problems. "The law," in its
various illustrations, was something that every American-with a
little help from a commentator-could grasp. The authority of legal
49. For a discussion of late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century legal science, see THE
MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, supra note 13, at 144-55; and sources cited
therein. See also Raack, supra note 13, at 363-65; Stychin, supra note 35, at 451-55.
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principles came from their recurrent promulgation as well as from
their essential "truth," that is their harmony with the same metaprin-
ciples that implicitly ordered scientific and philosophical subjects in
the first place.
But if "the law" was reflected in a continuous series of judge-
declared rules, how did one preserve its integrity in the face of its
being constantly repromulgated in new cases? Here again our
contemporary instincts are likely to hinder a faithful recreation of
Kent's jurisprudential universe. When Kent used the words
"progress" and "improvement," he took them to be synonyms. He did
not conceive of qualitative change over time to be a fundamental,
defining feature of human societies; instead he equated change,
progress, and improvement with the perfection of existing institution-
al structures, social orders, and systems of knowledge. 0 Kent's
perspective is comparatively easy to glimpse if one focuses on his
responses to the contested social and political issues of his day, but it
may be harder to extract his perspective from his legal writings. In
debates on questions of political economy, he took the mainstream
Federalist republicanism of George Washington and John Marshall,
with its emphasis on class politics, limited definitions of suffrage,
antagonism toward state legislatures, and commitment to an
enlightened, virtuous elite of civic-minded propertyholders, to be the
defining political ideology of America. He then attempted to perfect
that ideology by shoring it up against demagogic, leveling, and
potentially corrupt oppositionist elements.5' In taking these positions
he regarded himself as being on the side of progress-improvement-
not against it.
In his Commentaries, Kent assumed the same stance. In his
distillations of common law rules he was regularly confronted with
the unproblematic status of certain doctrinal formulations. These he
took to be the equivalent of collective wisdom, a species of scientific
truth. Where a rule or doctrine was unproblematic, the job of the
commentator was to reconcile new decisions with it. If some new
decisions were irreconcilable, but the rule was entrenched and its
justifications readily apparent, the new decisions needed to be
discarded as errors: in such a fashion the law was improved or
50. For a discussion of early nineteenth-century attitudes toward qualitative change, see
THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, supra note 13, at 6-9.
51. As an example, see Kent's response to the legal and political issues raised by the New
York State Constitutional Convention of 1821, which resulted in revisions of that state's
constitution. His response is described in HORTON, supra note 3, at 245-59.
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perfected. Such occasions were rare for Kent, however, because the
methodology of his Commentaries was selective, not exhaustive. He
read a great many cases, but not all the reported cases of his time, and
he did not need to include all the cases he read in his syntheses. When
confronted with an abhorrent decision, he could conclude it was not
worthy of mention.
More difficult choices were posed by two other sets of synthetic
exercises. One was where an established common law rule appeared
to be not being followed, or being modified, in recent cases. Here
Kent made use of a conventional distinction employed by jurists of
his time. When a judge or a commentator was confronted with the
application of a rule to a case where it seemed to have an awkward
fit, or where another, possibly competing, rule seemed apposite, he
could appeal to "principle" as well as to "authority." The latter
appeal consisted of the sort of didactic compilation and discussion of
other decisions in which the rule had been invoked that was
characteristic of much of Kent's Commentaries. The former appeal
went beyond that technique to probe "the reason" animating an
established rule. By "reason or principle," Kent and his contempora-
ries meant what on the surface we would call "policy," but what they
ultimately meant was metapolitics: the assumed nature of things, the
starting social and political presuppositions from which they sought to
make sense of their experience.
Reasoning from "principle" in what Kent called "strong" cases
provided an opportunity for perfecting the law. In deciding whether
to retain or to modify an established rule whose application to a given
case seemed intuitively problematic, one probed the intellectual
justifications for that rule. In so doing, one reminded oneself of how
strongly those justifications resonated in contemporary America, or,
alternatively, that those justifications now seemed less compatible
with the current world. If the justifications continued to resonate, the
law would be "improved" if the application of the established rule to
the new case was grounded not only on authority but also on a
revigorated statement of "principle." If the justifications did not
resonate, the abandonment of the rule, and the substitution of an
alternative rule, would also be an improvement. The law was not so
much changing as perfecting itself.
This article has thus far explored the harmony of didactic writing
in American republican culture with the conceptions of intellectual
discovery and legal science that were dominant in Kent's time and
attempted to show how Kent drew upon both these traditions to
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address some of the jurisprudential puzzles he encountered as a
commentator. We have not yet addressed another role ascribed to
Kent by scholars: that of a legal writer in the tradition of European
institutionalists.
52
Kent was the first American jurist to make extensive use of
European sources as a commentator. He was aware of Blackstone's
reliance on Roman law in his Commentaries on the Law of England,
and he had copies of French and Dutch institutionalist writers in his
library. 3 Kent's typical treatment of European sources in his
Commentaries was in connection with a contested American common
law rule, where he invoked those sources, and sometimes European
decisions they cited, in connection with an argument from "authority"
or "principle. '54 John Langbein has argued, however, that Kent did
more than rely on institutionalist sources; he patterned his
Commentaries after the European institutes." In particular, Langbein
points to the breadth of Kent's subject matter, his focus on a national
legal system, his didactic purpose, and his category-dominated
methodological orientation as characteristic of institutionalist
literature .
5 6
The most impressive dimension of Langbein's argument, for me,
is that he highlights an important difference between Kent's
Commentaries and the thrust of subsequent nineteenth-century
American legal commentary issued by Americans. When Kent died in
1847 no one else had attempted a comprehensive treatment of
"American law," and Kent's remained the only such treatment when
its fourteenth edition appeared. Even those writers whose subject
matter coverage rivaled, or even exceeded, that of Kent-the most
prominent of whom was Joseph Story-issued books organized
52. Langbein, supra note 3, at 585-88, argues that Kent's Commentaries can be seen as the
last of a long tradition of "institutes" -comprehensive, didactic treatments of "the law" of
particular nations-rather than as an early example of an American "treatise"-a similarly
comprehensive treatment of a particular legal subject. I agree with Langbein that Kent drew
heavily on the institutionalist tradition in his Commentaries. But it would be anachronistic to
treat Kent's work as the equivalent of works produced in France, Holland, and Scotland in the
seventeenth century. But see id. at 588-89. Langbein draws on the work of Alan Watson, who
has regularly attempted to draw connections between the institutionalist genre in Roman law
and seventeenth-century continental works. See id. at 585-86 (citing ALAN WATSON, ROMAN
LAW AND COMPARATIVE LAW (1991)).
53. See id. at 590-92.
54. For an example taken at random, see Kent's discussion of the dower rights of women to
real property in 4 KENT, supra note 2, at 47-58.
55. Langbein also argues that Blackstone's Commentaries "deserve[] to be seen as part of
the institutionalist tradition." Langbein, supra note 3, at 590.
56. See id. at 586-87.
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around separate legal subjects.5 7 For Langbein, the decision to
attempt a comprehensive treatment of a nation's legal system, rather
than a treatment of a particular area of law, distinguishes "institutes"
from "treatises," and enables Kent to be swept into the institutionalist
camp. "Nobody ever again wrote a book like Kent's Commentaries,"
Langbein suggests, "because nobody needed one."5 8
The problem with Langbein's argument is that it proves too
much. A book like Kent's Commentaries was written again after the
Commentaries first appeared: Kent's book itself continued to be
written, in the form of new editions, until the close of the nineteenth
century.
Langbein's suggestions that the institutionalist genre disappeared
because its nationalistic focus, its didacticism, and its breadth became
outmoded do not seem plausible if one thinks of the success of
McGuffey readers, the recurrent waves of xenophobia and
chauvinism, or the continued heavy use of Blackstone and Kent as
staples of legal education in the late nineteenth century. It appears
that a number of American lawyers needed Kent, and responded to
the cultural messages embodied in his Commentaries, from the 1820s
through the Spanish-American War.
Langbein nonetheless seems to have grasped an essential feature
of Kent's Commentaries: the writer's adopting a posture in which the
synthetic presentation of legal rules is combined with an implicit
metapolitical organization and a didactic purpose. 9 Although Kent
divided his coverage into subject matter areas, there is a strong sense
in his Commentaries that American "law" was all of a piece: that it
reduced itself, on examination, to a series of recurrent, mutually
complimentary, rules that were themselves surrogates for broader
principles of social organization and political economy. Above all, it is
this sense of cultural authoritativeness in the commentator that
distinguishes Kent's Commentaries from the comprehensive treatises
that followed them. In those volumes the commentator's authorita-
tiveness is no less muted, but it is identified with expertise in a
particular subject. Kent implicitly claims much more: the ability to
57. See, e.g., JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (Boston,
Hillard, Gray, & Co. 1834); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (Boston, Hillard, Gray, & Co. 1833); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAW OF BAILMENTS (Cambridge, Hillard & Brown 1832). For a discussion of those treatises
and earlier law books, see THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, supra note 13, at
81-111.
58. Langbein, supra note 3, at 593.
59. See id. at 586-87, 591-93.
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propound, recast, and perfect the rules and principles of American
law.
Thus we are brought, finally, to the personal and cultural factors
that enabled Kent to succeed in making that claim plausible for over
seventy years-if one counts posthumous editions as evidence of
continued influence. To the extent that the ghost of the Chancellor
still haunts us, it would seem to be in the capacity of a personage who
once made his written work nearly synonymous with American law
itself. Even allowing for his shrewdness as an entrepreneur, the
fortuitous advantages he brought to his project, and the striking
cultural need for the kind of book he could produce, Kent still had to
convince his audience that his declarative, didactic syntheses were
worth reading and taking as authoritative; that, in the informal
vernacular of his day, he was worth attending. How did he pull that
off?
IV
In exploring how Kent created and cemented his role as a savant,
and the cultural importance of that role for early nineteenth-century
America, I want to take up two additional extended passages from
the Commentaries. One passage shows Kent on doctrinal ground he
takes to be quite solid, although it looks like quicksand to us: the law
of illegitimate children. The other pertains to one of the most
treacherous legal, political, and philosophical issues of Kent's day: the
legal status of what he called Indian tribes. In the forthcoming
analysis of both passages, consider how the sort of reader incliried to
pay close attention Kent's Commentaries in, say, 1830 might have
reacted to them. Consider also, of course, the extreme vulnerability of
Kent's formulations for us, a vulnerability brought about by time and
the striking dissimilarities between Kent's America and ours. As
elsewhere, we run the risk of misunderstanding Kent if we rush
through the perceived gaps in his reasoning to make pejorative
judgments.
I proceed next to examine the situation of illegitimate children,
or bastards, who are begotten and born out of lawful wedlock.[6°]
These unhappy fruits of illicit connexion were, by the civil and
canon laws, made capable of being legitimated by the subsequent
marriage of their parents; and this doctrine of legitimation prevails
at this day, with different modifications, in France, Germany,
60. The passage being quoted is from 2 KENT, supra note 2, at 173-77 (footnotes omitted).
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Holland, and Scotland.[61] But this principle has never been
introduced into the English law; and Sir William Blackstone has
elaborately and zealously maintained, in this respect, the superior
policy of the common law. . . .[62]
... The opposition of the English barons to the introduction of
the rule of the civil law [to which Kent had previously alluded in a
discussion of English sources], is supposed to have arisen, not so
much from any aversion to the principle itself, as to the sanction
which would thereby be giveti to the superiority of the civil over
their own common law. In the new civil code of France,[63] the rule
of the civil law is adopted, provided the illegitimate children were
not offspring of incestuous or adulterous intercourse, and were duly
acknowledged by their parents before marriage, or in the act of
celebration....
But not only children born before marriage, but those that are
born so long after the death of the husband, as to destroy all
presumption of their being his; and, also, all children born during
the long and continued absence of the husband, so that no access to
the mother can be presumed, are reputed bastards. The question of
the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child of a married woman, is
now regarded as a matter of fact, resting on presumptions going to
establish a conclusion one way or the other, and it is a question for
a jury to determine .... [64]
A bastard being, in the eye of our law, nullius filius,[65].... has
no inheritable blood, and is incapable of inheriting as heir, either to
his putative father, or his mother, or any one else, not can he have
heirs but of his own body.[66] This rule, so far at least as it excludes
him from inheriting as heir to his mother, is supposed to be
founded partly in policy, to discourage illicit commerce between
the sexes.... Bastards are, undoubtedly, incapable of taking in this
61. Kent's footnote, id. at 173 n.c, cited English, French, and Dutch sources, including a
dissertation by a French commentator, Chancelier D'Aguesseau, on the principles of the French
and Roman law as they pertained to illegitimate children.
62. See id. at 174 n.a (citing 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at 456).
63. Kent's footnote, id. at 174 n.d, cited sections in the Civil Code of France. Kent then
added a paragraph in the text discussing a potentially "rigorous consequence" of the civil law
doctrine that an illegitimate child could be legitimated by the subsequent marriage of its
parents. In Holland, which followed the civil law doctrine, if A were to father a male child out of
wedlock, and then father a male child by his wife, the illegitimate child could deprive the
legitimate one of his inheritance should A's wife die and A marry the mother of the illegitimate
child. See id. at 174-75.
64. Kent's footnote, id. at 175 n.b, cited a variety of sources, most of them from English
cases or commentators. He added one reference to the French Code Napoleon. In the text, he
added that "[i]t is not necessary that I should dwell more particularly on this branch of the law,"
noting that "the principles and reasoning" upon which the "doctrine of presumption applicable
to the question of legitimacy" were founded would "be seen at large in the cases." Id. at 175.
65. "No child at all." Kent's footnote, id. at 175 n.c, was to 1 SIR EDWARD COKE, THE
INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND; OR, A COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON 123(a)
(Francis Hargrave & Charles Butler eds., Philadelphia, Robert H. Small 1853) (1628).




state,[67] under our law of descents, which speaks of lawful issue,
and we follow the rule of the English law; but in several of these
United States, the rigor of the English law has been relaxed, and
bastards can inherit to their mother equally as if they were her
lawful children .... [68] These decisions rest on a very reasonable
principle, that the relation of mother and child, which exists in this
unhappy case, in all its native and binding force, ought to produce
the ordinary legal consequences of that consanguinity.... With the
exception of the right of inheritance and succession, bastards, by
the English law, as well as by the laws of France, Spain, and Italy,
are put upon an equal footing with their fellow subjects;[ 69 ] and in
this country we have made very considerable advances towards
giving them also the capacity to inherit, by admitting them to
possess inheritable blood. We have, in this respect, followed the
spirit of the laws of some of the ancient nations, who denied to
bastards an equal share of their father's estate, (for that would be
giving too much countenance to the indulgence of criminal desire,)
but admitted them to a certain portion, and would not suffer them
to be cast naked and destitute upon the world.[70]
In this passage we see Kent comfortably assuming an
authoritative posture. He is in command of the sources, having
investigated the legal status of illegitimate children in a number of
American states, England, Holland, France, Spain, Italy, and ancient
Greece and Rome, and having consulted commentary as well as cases.
He takes his audience to agree with him on the tacit boundaries of his
discussion. No one is going to ask the awkward question of why the
state should care how a citizen disposes of his or her inheritance when
the disposition involves persons born in or out of wedlock. No one is
going to ask the equally awkward question of why a child should be
penalized for the circumstances of his or her birth when he or she was
only fortuitously associated with those circumstances. And certainly
no one is going to ask why the entire discussion about the English
common law of inheritance takes place against a backdrop in which
67. This reference reflected an apparent assumption on Kent's part that most of his readers
would be residents of New York and may reflect the origins of his Commentaries in lectures to
New York-based law students. Most of the citations to American cases in Kent's Commentaries
were to New York cases, many of which Kent himself had decided.
68. Kent's footnote, 2 KENT, supra note 2, at 176 n.b, referred to cases in Indiana, North
Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee, Vermont, and Virginia which he had extracted from Griffith's
Register. He added a recent Connecticut decision, Heath v. White, 5 Conn. 228 (1824), in the
text.
69. In support of this proposition Kent cited the Roman law ordinance of Justinian, several
English cases, a Massachusetts case, a Connecticut case, Blackstone, Coke, and the French
commentator D'Aguesseau. See 2 KENT, supra note 2, at 177 nn.c, d.
70. Kent's footnote, id. at 177 n.e, included references to English works on ancient Greece
and Rome and a quotation from the Roman satirist Juvenal describing the goddess Fortune's
protective attitude on discovering two naked, innocent foundlings in a public place.
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female children cannot inherit at all if they have any male relatives.
The policy choices highlighted in Kent's discussion-those pitting the
state's purported obligation to create disincentives for persons to
produce offspring outside of marriage against the state's purported
obligation not to "suffer [illegitimate children] to be cast naked and
destitute upon the world" - are interesting, contested choices once
one sweeps the awkward questions away. And Kent does an
impressive job of analyzing those choices.
Kent's initial presentation of the alternative legal treatments of
illegitimacy, which introduces the less harsh civil law doctrine first
and emphasizes that the origins of the English common law doctrine
may have primarily been related to provincial stubbornness on the
part of medieval barons, has the effect of isolating the English
doctrine. The presentation appears balanced, however: Kent notes a
potentially absurd consequence of following the civil law rule of
subsequent legitimation and treats "lawful issue" in New York
jurisprudence as necessarily meaning "lawful" within the meaning of
the English common law.
The New York example, and the strong presumption that
American jurisdictions will be guided by English common law that
accompanies it, has the effect of suggesting that the "law as it is" in
America will proceed from the proposition that an illegitimate child is
no child at all, at least with respect to inheritability. But at the same
time that Kent establishes this suggestion, he introduces reasons to
doubt its efficacy. Some of the reasons emphasize the unfortunate
predicament of illegitimate children, whose status has been arbitrarily
imposed upon them. Kent began by calling them the "unhappy fruits"
of liaisons out of wedlock; he now emphasizes that their incapacity to
inherit can be determined even where the only evidence of their
illegitimate status is that their putative fathers' paternity cannot easily
be proven. He notes that as a nullius filius a child has no inheritable
blood at all: he or she cannot succeed to an estate from anyone. And
he points out that some American jurisdictions are beginning to relax
the English rule, permitting illegitimate children to inherit from their
mother.
At the same time Kent states the primary policy reason favoring
the rigorous English rule: "to discourage illicit commerce between the
sexes." Earlier he had noted that bastards were not only "unhappy"
in their situation, but the offspring of an "illicit connexion." Kent's
contemporaries entertained that policy argument mindful of the fact
that birth control devices were limited; that pregnancy and childbirth
[Vol. 74:229
THE CHANCELLOR'S GHOST
were often dangerous; that social status was a highly significant, and
not particularly fluid, determinant of the quality of life; that sexual
urges were fundamental; that government played a very small part in
the maintenance of unwanted or destitute children; and that
traditional religious beliefs strongly discouraged extramarital sexual
activity. To state a societal concern with "illicit commerce between
the sexes" was to conjure up all those associations.
Thus the policy choices, captured in Kent's description of
illegitimate children as both being "unhappy" and the offspring of an
"illicit" relationship, had been nicely posed for readers of the
Commentaries. Kent then suggested that in America a resolution of
the choice between the English and civil law treatments was already
taking place. Even though his own jurisdiction followed the English
rule in all its rigor, "in this country we have made very considerable
advances towards giving [illegitimate children] ... the capacity to
inherit, by admitting them to possess inheritable blood." It is hard to
know who Kent meant by "we" in that sentence: he had cited seven
American state courts, a distinct minority even for 1826. But he
followed up that sentence with the suggestion that although bastards
should surely not be given an equal share of their fathers' estates,
they could receive "a certain portion." In the light of this conclusion,
Kent's entire discussion of the law of inheritance appeared as a
careful exegesis of the continued importance, and ultimate unsound-
ness, of the rigorous English rule, but not a call for "too much
countenance to the indulgence of criminal desire."'"
Kent could have been confident, in his discussion of the law of
illegitimate children, that neither he, his readers, nor early
nineteenth-century American courts were likely to embrace any
sweeping doctrinal changes. The success of that discussion had come
from his mastery of the relevant sources and the subtlety of his attack
on the doctrinal rule followed in his own state, and he had been
advantaged, on both fronts, by the relatively narrow framework
within which his contemporaries were inclined to discuss illegitimacy
and inheritance. In contrast, Kent began his discussion of the law of
real property with a central, and burning, issue: the legal and
philosophical foundations of title to land, with special reference to the
status of lands occupied by Indian tribes in America.72
71. Kent's choice of the word "criminal" to describe extramaritally directed sexual "desire"
was yet another reminder of the associational baggage his contemporaries identified with
extramarital sexual activity.
72. I analyze portions of the passage in 3 KENT, supra note 2, at 307-19.
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At the time Kent was developing the lectures that would become
his Commentaries, the Supreme Court of the United States was
considering the legal status of titles to land occupied by Indian tribes.
The question of that status was a momentous one, bringing to the
surface contradictions at the core of American republican culture. A
foundational value of republican thought, as it developed in America,
was recognition of a prepolitical right in humans to own land and to
enjoy the benefits of that ownership. Monarchies had denied that
right by assigning all land to the crown and identifying all other
landholders as tenants at royal sufferance, but English monarchical
government had itself virtually abandoned that relationship, and
American republicanism sought to abolish it entirely. Humans had
certain inalienable rights before entering into patterns of social
organization; government existed to secure such rights; holding and
owning property, especially real property, was one of the rights to be
secured.
The logic of republicanism thus pointed toward prepolitical
ownership of land by the native American tribes who occupied that
land when the first waves of European colonists settled in what was to
become the United States. Indian tribes were composed of humans;
those tribes were in possession of. certain lands; by the standards of
the English common law, they could justly exclude others from those
lands and thus "owned," or had title to, them. But there were certain
difficulties. Most Indian tribes did not signal their "ownership" of
land in the eighteenth- or early nineteenth-century European fashion,
by transforming it from a wilderness state into something more suited
to European notions of cultivation and extraction of natural products.
Some did not settle on particular portions of land at all. And, most
importantly, by the 1820s most native American tribes had either
been forcibly dispossessed of their land or were in the process of
being so.
It was comparatively easy for early nineteenth-century American
jurists to analogize the forcible dispossession of Indian tribes from
land they had occupied to the military conquest of one nation by
another. In the early nineteenth-century law of nations the
"discoveries" of non-European societies by Europeans had been
quickly linked to military conquest, dispossession, and a transfer of
sovereignty. The United States government, and the governments of
individual states, were clearly in control of large amounts of land once
inhabited by Indian tribes, and in many instances that control was a
direct result of military conquest and forcible dispossession. But
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where Indian titles were concerned, sovereignty in fact clashed with
sovereignty in republican theory. The clash was illustrated by cases in
which descendants of European settlers sought to enforce titles to
land they had obtained from native tribes. In the Supreme Court case
of Johnson v. McIntosh,73 for example, a resident of Virginia claimed
title to land that his father had obtained in a 1775 conveyance from
the Piankeshaw tribe. The title was contested by a prospective settler
who had been granted the land by the state of Virginia as part of an
emolument for Revolutionary war service. That grant had taken place
in 1784, so the settler's title could not prevail unless the previous title
was to be treated as having no legal effect.
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion written by Chief
Justice John Marshall, concluded that although native American
tribes were "the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as
just claim to retain possession of it," the "fundamental principle, that
discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it" denied the tribes'
"power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they
pleased. '74 If this sounds like sophistry, it is. The tribes had a "legal as
well as just claim" to own the land they inhabited, but nothing
followed from that claim, not even a right of occupancy, since
discovery led to conquest and thus to dispossession. The sophistry
was required to resolve a fundamental contradiction between the
purportedly universal scope of human rights under republican theory
and the fact that Indian occupancy of land in America was
incompatible with European patterns of settlement. Marshall offered
two resolutions of that contradiction: abstract natural rights yielded to
the positive laws of conquering nations, and native American tribes
were not "humans" for the purposes of possessing inalienable natural
rights. The former resolution, although endorsed by the Court in
Johnson v. McIntosh, threatened to undermine the natural rights
basis of republican government, and the latter resolution, put so
baldly, was extremely awkward. Nonetheless Marshall and his
contemporaries, mindful of the fact that the westward expansion of
European settlers in America went hand in hand with the forcible
dispossession of Indian tribes from land, felt they had no choice.
75
In his discussion of the foundation of title to land, Kent
73. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
74. Id. at 574.
75. For a discussion of the views of Marshall, Joseph Story, James Madison, and other early
nineteenth-century public figures on "the Indian question," see THE MARSHALL COURT AND
CULTURAL CHANGE, supra note 13, at 703-38.
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associated himself with the Marshall Court's resolutions. First he
stated what he took to be the black-letter law of native American real
property "rights":
Even with respect to the Indian reservation lands, of which they
still retain the occupancy, the fee [simple title to the land] is
supposed to reside in the state .... The nature of the Indian title to
lands lying within the jurisdiction of a state, though entitled to be
respected by all courts until it be legitimately extinguished, is not
such as to be absolutely repugnant to a seisin in fee on the part of
the government within whose jurisdiction the lands are situated.
Such a claim may be consistently maintained, upon the principle
which has been assumed, that the Indian title is reduced to mere
occupancy.
76
Next Kent set out to justify the reduction of tribal ownership of
land from the legal status of an inalienable, prepolitical right to one of
"mere occupancy." In Johnson v. McIntosh, Marshall had advanced
several justifications for that conclusion; Kent set forth each of them
and added some of his own. Most of Marshall's justifications have
previously been mentioned. Kent combined a few of them in one
striking excerpt:
In Johnson v. M'Intosh, it was stated as an historical fact, that on
the discovery of this continent by the nations of Europe, the
discovery was considered to have given to the government by
whose subjects or authority it was made, the sole right of acquiring
the soil from the natives as against all other European powers.
Each nation claimed the right to regulate for itself, in exclusion of
all others, the relation which was to subsist between the discoverer
and the Indians. That relation necessarily impaired, to a
considerable degree, the rights of the original inhabitants, and an
ascendancy was asserted in consequence of the superior genius of
the Europeans, founded on civilization and christianity, and of their
superiority in the means, and in the art of war.... The United
States adopted the same principle, and their exclusive right to
extinguish the Indian title by purchase or conquest, and to grant the
soil, and exercise such a degree of sovereignty as circumstances
required, has never been judicially questioned. 77
In Kent's hands the interconnectedness of European discovery,
conquest, and sovereignty went from the status of jurisprudential
theory to that of "historical fact." Not only had the "claim" by the
discovering European nation to assert its own sovereignty over the
lands it had discovered, and to establish its own relationship with the
natives of the discovered continent, been taken as incontrovertible,
76. 3 KENT, supra note 2, at 308.
77. Id. at 309 (footnote omitted).
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the diminution of the "rights of the original inhabitants" had also
been taken to be necessary. But there were some additional reasons
for the reduction of tribal rights in the lands they occupied to a
nullity: "the superior genius of the Europeans" and "their superiority
in the means, and in the art of war." Kent felt those reasons required
some more elaboration.
The whites assert the right to a qualified dominion over the Indian
tribes, and to regard them as enjoying no higher title to the soil
than that founded on simple occupany, and to be incompetent to
transfer their title to any other power than the government which
claims the jurisdiction of their territory by right of discovery. This
assumed claim or right arises from the necessity of the case. To
leave the Indians in possession of the country was to leave the
country a wilderness, and to govern them as a distinct people, or to
mix with them, and admit them to an intercommunity of privileges,
was impossible under the circumstances of their relative condition.
The peculiar character and habits of the Indian nations, rendered
them incapable of sustaining any other relation with the whites
than that of dependence and pupilage. There was no other way of
dealing with them than that of keeping them separate, subordinate,
and dependent, with a guardian care thrown around them for their
protection. The rule that the Indian title was subordinate to the
absolute, ultimate title of the government of the European
colonists, and that the Indians were to be considered as occupants,
and entitled to protection in peace in that character only, and
incapable of transferring their right to others, was the best one that
could be adopted with safety. The weak and helpless condition in
which we found the Indians, and the immeasurable superiority of
their civilized neighbours, would not admit of the application of any
more liberal and equal doctrine to the case of Indian lands and
contracts. It was founded on the pretension of converting the
discovery of the country into a conquest, and it is now too late to
draw into discussion the validity of that pretension, or the
restrictions which it imposes. It is established by numerous
compacts, treaties, laws, and ordinances, and founded on
immemorial usage. The country has been colonized and settled, and
is now held by that title. It is the law of the land, and no court of
justice can permit the right to be disturbed by speculative
reasonings on abstract rights.78
Our contemporary sensibility is likely to recoil from this excerpt.
It combines a bald rationalization of a relationship created by military
conquest with stereotyped, patronizing, and chauvinistic racial gener-
alizations. It draws from the standard battery of specious legal
arguments-the "necessity of the case" requires the seizure of Indian
lands, a hypothetically dubious legal principle is now too established
78. Id. at 310-11.
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to reexamine, subordination of a minority is for the minority's own
good-in such a way as to confirm its own defensiveness, at least from
the point of view of an instinctively hostile reader. But suppose, once
again, we try to put ourselves in the place of Kent's contemporary
readers.
On encountering this passage, a reader of the first edition of
Kent's Commentaries might be expected to gain the impression that
the anomalous status of Indian rights to freehold land was a settled
jurisprudential proposition, all the more so because "the country has
been colonized and settled, and is now held" in accordance with that
proposition. But when Kent's first edition appeared, the Supreme
Court's Cherokee cases, the Cherokee and Chickasaw tribes' dispos-
session from lands east of the Mississippi, the confrontations with the
Navaho, Sioux, Apache, and Comanche tribes, the eventual
subordination of the Utes and the Nez Pierce, and the imposition of
federal Indian reservations were all in the future. The westward
expansion of the American nation was to be a series of episodes in
European colonization, settling, and holding of land formerly
occupied by Indian tribes. Kent and his readers knew, in a general
sense, that this future was coming. They might not have anticipated
the Battle of Little Big Horn, but they had experienced the Louisiana
Purchase. Lewis and Clark had returned from their expedition by
1807, and Nicholas Biddle's history of their journey had been
published in 1814.
79
So Kent's black-letter summaries of, and justifications for, the
creation of an exception for lands owned by Indian tribes from the
normally sacrosanct legal and political status of freehold ownership
need to be seen as a carefully constructed blueprint for present and
future policymaking in what came to be called "Indian affairs." Our
79. See NICHOLAS BIDDLE, HISTORY OF THE EXPEDITION UNDER THE COMMAND OF
CAPTAINS LEWIS AND CLARK, TO THE SOURCES OF THE MISSOURI, THENCE ACROSS THE
ROCKY MOUNTAINS AND DOWN THE RIVER COLUMBIA TO THE PACIFIC OCEAN (Paul Allen
ed., Philadelphia, Bradford & Inskeep 1814); see STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, UNDAUNTED
COURAGE 420, 480 (1997). And consider this excerpt from Kent's discussion of Indian titles:
If it were not for the frontier garrisons and troops of the United States, officered by
correct and discreet men, there would probably be a state of constant hostility between
the Indians, and the white borderers and hunters [occupying lands near those still
occupied by tribes]. They covet the Indian hunting grounds, and they must have them;
and the Indians will finally be compelled by circumstances, annoyed as they are from
without, and with a constantly and rapidly diminishing population, and with increasing
poverty and misery, to recede from all the habitable parts of the Mississippi valley, and
its tributary streams, until they become essentially extinguished, or lost to the eye of
the civilized world.
3 KENT, supra note 2, at 318 n.a.
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current sense of dissonance toward those summaries and justifications
should not be confused with the impact they had on Kent's
contemporaries.
A very small minority of native Americans would have been
among Kent's readers, and they had been accounted for as part of the
group inclined toward "speculative reasonings on abstract rights." 80
The overwhelming number of his readers would have approached his
discussion with a particular experience of, and consciousness about,
Indian tribes. Their experience would have included a memory of
hostile, sometimes violent, confrontations with tribes who had been
their neighbors, or neighbors of their parents or grandparents. It
would have also included a memory of the subjugation of those tribes,
their dispossession, and the dramatically visual contrasts between
their culture, social organization, religious practices, and personal
styles and those of white Americans. It would have included another
set of memories or current experiences: those of settlers on a vast
continent, still primarily wilderness, identifying themselves with the
land they owned and tried to transform into something resembling
European-style fields, farms, and lots. If white settlers, with guns and
axes and farm tools and carriages and books and steamboats, were
oneself and one's peers, for Kent's original readers, native Indian
tribes were other. They were not white; they were not settlers; they
were not civilized; they were not militarily dominant; they were not
enterprising in the European fashion. And they were in the way of
American growth. Speculating about the awkward legal and
philosophical dimensions of forcibly dispossessing the Indians of land
they had inhabited before Kent's readers and their ancestors had
come to America was, ultimately, pointless. Indians were the other;
they could not "mix," they could only be eradicated or made wards of
the state.
"If the settled doctrine on the subject of Indian rights and titles
was now open for discussion," Kent concluded,
the reasonableness of it might be strongly vindicated on broad
principles of policy and justice, drawn from the right of discovery;
from the sounder claim of agricultural settlers over tribes of
hunters; and from the loose and frail, if not absurd title of
wandering savages to an immense continent, evidently designed by
80. For a discussion of a predominantly English-speaking, legally educated, "elite" segment
of the Cherokee tribe, typified by John Ross, its chief from 1828 to 1866, see WILLIAM G.
McLOUGHLIN, CHEROKEES AND MISSIONARIES 1789-1839, at 180-84, 213-31 (1984).
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Providence to be subdued and cultivated, and to become the
residence of civilized nations.81
He attempted to support each of these "broad principles of
policy and justice" in the remaining portions of his discussion of
native American land titles, invoking, among other justifications, the
"true principles of natural law" which imposed obligations in the
human race to cultivate the soil and not to "usurp more territory than
[humans] can subdue and cultivate. '82 Late twentieth-century readers
will likely be inclined to regard Kent's supportive arguments as
hollow to the point of being embarrassing.83 But Kent's original
readers took his general assessment of the experience of Indian-white
relations in America to represent truth:
We [originally] found them, a numerous, enterprising, and proud
spirited race; and we now find them, a feeble and degraded
remnant, rapidly hastening to annihilation. The neighbourhood of
the whites seems, hitherto, to have had an immoral influence upon
Indian manners and habits, and to have destroyed all that was
noble and elevated in the Indian character. They have generally,
and with some very limited exceptions, been unable to share in the
enjoyments, or to exist in the presence of civilization; and judging
from their past history, the Indians of this continent appear to be
destined, at no very distant period of time, to disappear with those
vast forests which once covered the country, and the existence of
which seems essential to their own.84
Kent and his original readers knew that the destiny of the
American continent to be cultivated by persons of European origin
was ineluctably intertwined with the destiny of Indian tribes to
disappear from "the eye of the civilized world."
V
What common elements can we extract from the two lengthy
passages analyzed above, and how can those elements help define
Kent's status as a savant? Despite the relative mundanity -to Kent's
contemporaries -of the issues raised in his discussion of illegitimate
children and the central importance of those raised in his discussion
81. 3 KENT, supra note 2, at 312.
82. Id.
83. Two particularly arresting arguments were Kent's claim that "[tihough the conquest of
the half civilized empires of Mexico and Peru was a palpable usurpation, and an act of atrocious
injustice, the establishment of the French and English colonies in North America was entirely
lawful," and his assertion that "[t]he government of the United States, since the period of our
independence, has ... pursued a steady system of pacific, just, and paternal policy towards the
Indians." Id. at 313, 317.
84. Id. at 318.
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of Indian titles to land, Kent's stance, to his original readers,
appeared comparable. He was a commentator who was prepared to
discuss not only authorities but arguments from principle and from
policy, and he was not inclined to blink difficulties or to reveal what
he took to be weaknesses in established doctrines. The last comment
might seem preposterous if one takes a contemporary perspective on
illegitimacy or the rights of native Americans: such a reader might
well conclude that Kent's discussions blink all the difficulties. But to
Kent's original readers, and to at least two subsequent generations of
readers, his discussions revealed him as a legal writer who could grasp
fundamental questions of social and political organization as they
manifested themselves in rules of black-letter law. He not only saw
the strains, the anomalies, and the fictions in established doctrine, he
linked up those features to the major cultural issues, and the starting
intellectual assumptions, of his educated early American peers. A
contemporary reading Kent might find him occasionally strident or
defensive when the probing of a doctrinal rule brought its
metapolitical overtones rather too conspicuously to light. But few
would have found his discussions other than stimulating. Far from
having no general ideas, Kent was something of an embodiment of
the general ideas of his time. Those ideas were a mix of philosophy,
what passed for science, political economy, republican theory, and
law. In his own fashion Kent was a disciple of "law and."
Kent's particular felicity in distilling the central intellectual
questions that interested his elite contemporaries, and in
demonstrating that those questions were implicated in the homeliest
area of American common law, was the foremost source of his
authority as a savant. To be sure, he had read a great deal more legal
sources than nearly anyone else in America at the time, he had a
knack for synthesis, he wrote elegantly within the canons of early
nineteenth-century educated prose, and he had an instinctive ability
to guide the reader without making his personality too obtrusive.
These qualities alone would have served to produce a law book of
distinction at a time when very few law books existed. But Kent
produced a law book that made him wealthy and influential in his
own lifetime, and has significantly contributed to the fact that we
continue, occasionally, to try to take his measure. The difference
between the sort of book that has great popular success in its day, and
that which endures well beyond the lifetime of most books, is easily
stated, though hardly easily replicated. The unusually enduring book,
like Kent's Commentaries, somehow penetrates to the core issues
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absorbing the culture in which it was written. Its penetration is
sufficiently acute, and sufficiently deep, that it brings with it a little
piece of that culture, and in the process helps emphasize that culture's
affinities, or thought-provoking disaffinities, with our own.
Most of us should be enlarged by a visit with the Chancellor's
Ghost. It might not be an entirely pleasant experience, but surely not
a scary one.
